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INTRODUCTION 
mployment discrimination claims can present challenging 
problems of proof. Indeed, it is a rare occurrence when a plaintiff 
can produce direct evidence of an employer’s intent to discriminate.1 
As a result, a plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence to show 
that an employer’s proffered reason for an adverse employment action 
was either false or pretextual. Often, such circumstantial evidence is 
presented in the form of “me too” evidence. So-called “me too” 
evidence allows the plaintiff to present testimony of other employees 
to demonstrate that an employer discriminated against similarly 
situated individuals. “Me too” evidence has proven to be a powerful 
tactic for plaintiffs and, consequently, a serious threat to employers. 
While “me too” evidence has received significant attention among 
scholars, the possibility of “not me too” evidence has been 
continuously overlooked. “Not me too” evidence, that is, evidence 
that other employees did not suffer discrimination, allows an 
employer to rebut a plaintiff’s discrimination claim. Instead, the 
discussion surrounding “me too” evidence has focused primarily on 
the threat it poses to employers.2 This is certainly a legitimate 
concern; however, it fails to consider that if an employee may argue 
“me too,” then what is preventing an employer from offering “not me 
too” evidence? While some scholars and practitioners have caught on, 
for the most part, the concept of “not me too” evidence has received 
minimal attention.3 As a result, courts’ treatment of these two forms 
of evidence has also gone unnoticed. 
This Comment focuses on the disparate manner in which courts 
respond to “me too” versus “not me too” evidence. Specifically, this 	  
1 See, e.g., Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“Employment discrimination cases inevitably present difficult problems of proof, 
precisely because we cannot peer into the minds of decisionmakers to determine their true 
motivations.”); see also Artega v. Brink’s, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 327, 342 (2008) (noting 
that plaintiffs rarely produce direct evidence or “smoking gun” evidence of 
discrimination). 
2 See generally Emily D. Wilson, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: Tenth 
Circuit Employment Law Remains in “Me Too” Limbo, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 185 (2010) 
(discussing how “me too” evidence has the “potential to generate lengthier trials, increase 
the expense of litigation, and reduce the overall efficiency of the legal system”); see also 
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: The Supreme 
Court Appears to have Punted on the Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence of 
Discrimination. But Did It?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 264, 274-75 (2008). 
3 See, e.g., Angelina LaPenotiere & Marcus D. Brown, Admissibility of “Me Too” 
Evidence in the Post-Mendelsohn Era, 20 No. 1 PRAC. LITIGATOR 57, 61 (2009); 
Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 274. 
E 
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Comment describes how courts have been more liberal about 
admitting “not me too” evidence. Part I of this Comment provides a 
framework for employment discrimination claims, including an 
overview of Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
test. Part II discusses “me too” evidence prior to the Supreme Court 
of the United States’ decision regarding its admissibility. Part III 
examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint/United Management 
Co. v. Mendelsohn. Part IV discusses “me too” and “not me too” 
evidence in the post-Sprint era, including how courts have treated 
cases that involve both “me too” and “not me too” evidence. Finally, 
Part V examines why courts might be treating “me too” evidence 
differently and offers suggestions for how courts can provide similar 
scrutiny in determining the admissibility for both forms of evidence. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF “ME TOO” EVIDENCE 
“Me too” evidence is a particular type of circumstantial proof. 
When a plaintiff sets out to prove a disparate treatment discrimination 
claim under Title VII, a court will apply the traditional McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting test.4 First, the plaintiff must prove a prima 
facie case of discrimination.5 A plaintiff makes a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that she was: (1) a member of a statutorily protected 
class, (2) qualified for the position and satisfied its normal 
requirements, but (3) was discharged under, (4) circumstances that 
create an inference of unlawful discrimination.6 
Second, once the plaintiff has successfully made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant 
employer, who must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse action.7 The employer need not “persuade the court that it 
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the 
	  
4 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). But see 
Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that in the context of a Title VII 
or ADEA case, a plaintiff has the option to show discrimination by using direct or indirect 
methods of proof). 
5 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
6 Id. at 802–03. 
7 Id. 
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defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it 
discriminated against the plaintiff.”8 
Third, after the employer presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the reason proffered by the 
defendant was merely pretext for discrimination.9 The most common 
ways that plaintiffs prove pretext include comparative data involving 
similarly situated individuals, statistics that reflect the overall 
composition of the employer’s workforce, or contradictions and 
inconsistencies in the employer’s explanations regarding the 
plaintiff’s circumstances.10 
It is the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework—the 
pretext stage—that presents the most problems for plaintiffs.11 As a 
practical matter, “me too” evidence arises at this stage as a form of 
pretext to rebut the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for the adverse action.12 Conversely, “not me too” evidence may be 
presented by the employer to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case of 
discrimination and support the employer’s legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason.13 In most cases, the opposing party will 
respond by filing a motion in limine or a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that such evidence is inadmissible. And, with a few 
exceptions, courts will usually exclude the “me too” evidence and 
allow the “not me too” evidence.14 
II 
“ME TOO” EVIDENCE IN THE PRE-SPRINT ERA 
In the employment context, “me too” evidence has a controversial 
history that has led to a circuit split among courts in determining its 
admissibility. “Me too” evidence is a powerful tool for plaintiffs 	  
8 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981) (citation 
omitted). 
9 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. 
10 Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 323 (2010). 
11 Id. at 323–26. 
12 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008). 
13 See, e.g., Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 523–24 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
14 Compare Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734 (S.D. Ohio 2011) 
(excluding “me too” evidence as mere opinions and subjective beliefs that are highly 
irrelevant and prejudicial), with Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(allowing “not me too” evidence of an employer’s past nondiscriminatory behavior toward 
other employees because it may be relevant). 
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because it allows them to rely on an employer’s motive in a different 
employment context with a different employee. However, this does 
not necessarily translate well and can present a number of problems.15 
In an attempt to provide clarity to the evidentiary doctrine of “me too” 
evidence, this Part will examine the three ways courts have treated 
this evidence prior to the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in 
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn.16 
With a few exceptions, the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits 
strictly excluded “me too” evidence.17 These courts viewed “me too” 
evidence as irrelevant under FRE 401.18 Likewise, even when these 
courts held that “me too” evidence was relevant, they would find it 
inadmissible under FRE 403 when its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.19 
Moreover, “me too” evidence that could confuse the issues or mislead 
the jury, or cause an undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence was also inadmissible under FRE 
403.20 For example, in Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., an 
age discrimination suit, a plaintiff attempted to offer testimony of two 
former employees who were told they were fired because of their 
	  
15 Perhaps most significant, is the concern that plaintiffs would be able to use such 
evidence to bootstrap their own claims. 
16 See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008).  
17 See, e.g., Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302–04 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(excluding “me too” evidence where it amounted to a “parade of anecdotal witnesses, each 
recounting his own, entirely unrelated contention of age discrimination”); Williams v. 
Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 
F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984); Goff v. Cont’l Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 596–97 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that testimony of former employees did not pertain to plaintiff); Moorhouse v. 
Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980). But 
see Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1995). 
18 FRE 401 provides that evidence is only relevant, if it has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401; see 
Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Serv., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1995). 
19 See, e.g., Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734–35 (S.D. Ohio 2011) 
(noting that trial courts regularly prohibit “me too” evidence from or about other 
employees who claim discriminatory treatment “because it is at best only slightly relevant 
and is always highly prejudicial to the defendant”); see also Williams, 132 F.3d at 1130; 
Haskell, 743 F.2d at 122; Moorhouse, 501 F. Supp. at 393. 
20 See, e.g., Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988); Harpring 
v. Cont’l Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980); Moorhouse, 501 F. Supp. at 394 
(excluding “me too” evidence that was cumulative). 
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age.21 The Sixth Circuit held that the “me too” evidence was 
irrelevant because the alleged statements from the witnesses could not 
be logically or reasonably tied to the decision to fire the plaintiff.22 In 
addition, the court held that such evidence was unduly prejudicial 
because it would tend to confuse the jury on the actual issue of the 
case.23 
By contrast, the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
admitted “me too” evidence, but only under fact-specific 
circumstances. These circuits focused on whether the “me too” 
witness and plaintiff were in the same protected class.24 Moreover, 
when the plaintiff and “me too” witness had the same supervisors, 
these courts would allow the evidence under FRE 404(b) to 
demonstrate motive or intent.25 
Finally, the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits admitted “me too” 
evidence much more liberally.26 Instead of carefully examining the 
facts and circumstances of a case, these courts would merely reason 
that, as a general rule, the evidence should be admitted.27 For 
example, in Spulak v. K Mart Corp., the plaintiff offered “me too” 
evidence from two former employees who were in the same protected 	  
21 Schrand, 851 F.2d at 155. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 156. 
24 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 694–99 (9th Cir. 2005); Cummings v. Standard Register 
Co., 265 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2001); Beachy v. Boise Cascade Corp., 191 F.3d 1010, 1014 
(9th Cir. 1999); Kozlowski v. Hampton Sch. Bd., 77 Fed. App’x 133, 149 (4th Cir. 2003); 
see also Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995) (admitting “me too” 
evidence in a quid pro quo sexual harassment case to prove the employer’s alleged sexual 
harassment of other female employees). 
25 See Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1286; Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 
1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983). 
26 See, e.g., Minshall v. McGraw Hill Broad. Co., 323 F.3d 1273, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 
2003) (noting that “me too” evidence is relevant when it can be logically or reasonably 
tied to the adverse action taken against the plaintiff); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 
1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990); Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 
1988) (finding that “blanket evidentiary exclusions” of other acts of discrimination 
involving other employees “can be especially damaging in employment discrimination 
cases”); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423–24 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting 
that “a flat rule that evidence of other discriminatory acts by or attributable to the 
employer can never be admitted without violating Rule 403 would be unjustified”). 
27 Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1155; see also Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 
153, 156 (8th Cir. 1990) (“me too” evidence “should normally be freely admitted at trial”). 
But see Manuel v. City of Chi., 335 F.3d 592, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the 
district court’s decision to exclude “me too” evidence that had slight probative value and 
the potential to be highly prejudicial, and cause juror confusion and undue delay). 
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age group, yet worked at different stores.28 Regardless, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the “me too” evidence was admissible because the 
testimony by former employees about the treatment they received 
from their former employer was relevant to the employer’s 
discriminatory intent.29 
Even where courts admitted “me too” evidence more liberally, they 
followed some reoccurring themes shared by almost all of the circuits. 
For instance, several courts observed a “same supervisor” rule.30 
Under this rule, testimony of other employees was strictly limited to 
only those people working under the same supervisor as the plaintiff. 
Moreover, courts also focused on whether the “me too” event took 
place during the same time period as the plaintiff’s claim.31 If the 
passage of time between the plaintiff’s claim was too temporally 
remote from the events of the “me too” evidence, courts generally 
excluded such evidence.32 Finally, courts considered other relevant 
factors, including whether the “me too” evidence involved a similar 
	  
28 Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1155. 
29 Id. at 1156. 
30 This is similar to how courts treat the “stray remark” doctrine. See Kerri Lynn Stone, 
Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 160 (2012) (explaining that courts consider 
whether the stray remark was made by the same decisionmaker and around the time of the 
decision); see also McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302–03 (5th Cir. 2000); Ercegovich v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 
112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997). 
31 See, e.g., Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988); Conway 
v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987) (admitting “me too” evidence 
separated by twenty-two months from the events of plaintiff’s claim); Stair v. Lehigh 
Valley Carpenters Local 600, 813 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (excluding 
evidence of discrimination against employees involving events that occurred four years 
prior to events involving plaintiff); see also Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 
F.3d 684, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2001) (excluding “me too” evidence in a sexual harassment 
case where the alleged harassment of other employees occurred five years before 
plaintiff’s claim). 
32 See Wyvill, 212 F.3d at 302–03; Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 
1130 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding a six-year gap between the “me too” witness and the 
plaintiff’s claim too remote); Garvey v. Dickinson Coll., 763 F. Supp. 799, 801–02 (M.D. 
Pa. 1991). But see Brillhart v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 938 F. Supp. 742, 748 (D.N.M. 
1996) (excluding “me too” evidence separated by only one year from the events of the 
plaintiff’s claim). 
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event,33 the same protected class,34 or the same type of claim.35 
Despite these reoccurring themes, courts continued to disagree on the 
admissibility of “me too” evidence, which resulted in a split of 
authority.36 
III 
THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN ON “ME TOO” EVIDENCE 
Because there was considerable uncertainty among courts in 
applying “me too” evidence, in 2008 the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to consider the issue.37 The case was 
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, and involved Ellen 
Mendelsohn, a fifty-one-year-old unit manager for Sprint who was 
terminated during a company-wide reduction in force.38 Mendelsohn 
filed an action against Sprint for age discrimination39 in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).40 To support 
her claim, she attempted to introduce “me too” evidence from five 
former employees that also alleged age discrimination.41 However, 
these other employees had different supervisors and worked in an 
entirely different division than Mendelsohn.42 
At trial, Sprint filed a motion in limine and argued that the “me 
too” evidence was irrelevant because the acts were committed by 
different supervisors. The district court agreed with Sprint and 
granted the motion.43 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and 
reasoned that the district court erred by applying a per se rule of 
inadmissibility, and thus, remanded the case for a new trial.44 The 	  
33 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(reasoning that the “me too” evidence involved a variety of responses based on different 
situations). 
34 See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110–11 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(gender); Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1104 (8th Cir. 1988) (race). 
35 See, e.g., Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding a weak 
correlation between race and gender discrimination). 
36 Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 267 (commenting on how “me too” evidence was “in a 
state of disarray”). 
37 See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 381 (2008). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006) (originally 
enacted as Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)). 
41 Sprint, 552 U.S. at 381. 
42 Id. at 382. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 383. 
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Supreme Court eventually granted certiorari to determine whether 
“me too” evidence is admissible only when the “same supervisor” is 
involved.45 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that “me too” 
evidence offered in discrimination cases is neither per se admissible 
nor per se inadmissible.46 The Court reasoned that whether evidence 
of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant requires a fact-based 
inquiry that “depends on many factors, including how closely related 
the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the 
case.”47 Beyond these principles, the Court remanded the case and 
declined to create a bright-line rule for this evidentiary doctrine, and 
therefore, lower courts were given considerable discretion in 
determining the admissibility of “me too” evidence. Unfortunately, 
this only led to further inconsistency among courts applying this 
evidentiary doctrine. 
IV 
“ME TOO” AND “NOT ME TOO” EVIDENCE POST-SPRINT 
Given that “me too” evidence involves a fact-intensive inquiry, 
courts post-Sprint have continued to adopt a variety of approaches. 
However, there is a consistent pattern in how courts approach “me 
too” and “not me too” evidence in which courts are more liberal about 
admitting an employer’s “not me too” evidence.48 To demonstrate 
that dichotomy, this Part begins by examining how courts have 
treated “me too” evidence post-Sprint. Then, this Part focuses on 
courts’ more liberal treatment of “not me too” evidence. Finally, this 
Part examines decisions where “me too” and “not me too” evidence 
are both present. 
A. “Me Too” Evidence 
“Me too” evidence post-Sprint has continued to reappear quite 
often in employment discrimination claims. In part, this is due to the 	  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 381. 
47 Id. at 388. 
48 See, e.g., Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008); Howard v. D.C. Pub. 
Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 53 (D.D.C. 2008); Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal. App. 4th 87, 87 
(2011); Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 173 Cal. App. 4th 
740, 759 (2009). 
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Supreme Court’s refusal to adopt a bright-line rule and instead 
conclude that “me too” evidence is neither per se admissible nor per 
se inadmissible.49 While courts in the pre-Sprint era treated “me too” 
evidence in one of three ways,50 this is no longer the case. 
Interestingly, certain courts that strictly excluded “me too” evidence 
prior to Sprint, now occasionally admit it.51 Generally, post-Sprint 
courts’ analyses include the following factors: (1) temporal and 
geographic proximity between the other employee and the plaintiff, 
(2) whether the other employee and the plaintiff were treated in the 
same manner, (3) whether the same decisionmakers were involved, 
and (4) whether the other employee and the plaintiff were similarly 
situated.52 Depending on the court, however, some factors are given 
more weight and relevance than others. 
First, temporal proximity remains an important factor for the 
majority of courts. Generally, events related to “me too” evidence that 
occurred one year or less before the events related to the plaintiff are 
sufficiently close in time.53 By contrast, incidents that gave rise to the 
“me too” witness that occurred ten years before the events at issue in 
the plaintiff’s case are too remote in time.54 Although there is no 
bright line rule for determining when “me too” evidence becomes too 
remote to be relevant, courts are likely to find a period longer than 
three years too remote.55 
Second, when the “me too” witness and the plaintiff received 
similar treatment, courts are more likely to admit the “me too” 	  
49 Sprint, 552 U.S. at 381. 
 50 See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 584 (6th Cir. 2012); Alaniz v. Zamora-
Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2009); Cange v. Phila. Parking Auth., No. 08-
3480, 2010 WL 365468, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2010). 
52 See, e.g., Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 809–10 (8th Cir. 2011); see also 
Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting factors such as whether the 
witness and plaintiff were treated in a similar manner, the same supervisors were involved, 
and the past discriminatory behavior by the employer was close in time to the events at 
issue in the current case). 
53 See Cange, 2010 WL 365468, at *3 (admitting events related to other employees 
occurring one year before the events related to plaintiff). 
54 See, e.g., Nuskey v. Hochberg, 723 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.D.C. 2010). 
55 See, e.g., Hill v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 09-5463, 2012 WL 646002, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 28, 2012) (finding conduct that took place two years prior to plaintiff’s 
termination recent enough to be relevant); Swiatek v. Bemis Co., No. 08-6081 (TJB), 2011 
WL 4753417, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2011) (excluding “me too” evidence that occurred three 
and a half years prior to the plaintiff’s incident); Hayes v. Sebelius, 806 F. Supp. 2d 141, 
145 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a four-year gap was too large to suggest a nexus between 
the two events). 
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evidence. As such, the nature of the employee’s allegation is critical. 
For example, in a decision from the District of Columbia Circuit, the 
court excluded the evidence because the “me too” witness claimed 
that he was discriminated against for being transferred to another 
position, while the plaintiff claimed that he was retaliated against by 
not being selected for a vacant position.56 This further reiterates that 
the admissibility of “me too” evidence is a fact-intensive and context-
specific inquiry. Accordingly, any plaintiff seeking to offer such 
evidence post-Sprint will have to demonstrate at least a reasonable 
connection to the theory of the case. 
Third, when the same decisionmaker is involved, courts are less 
likely to exclude “me too” evidence. Unlike decisions prior to Sprint, 
courts no longer apply a per se rule excluding or admitting evidence 
based on this factor alone.57 For instance, the Sixth Circuit has 
acknowledged that whether the same actors are involved represents 
only one of the factors in deciding whether to admit “me too” 
evidence.58 Still, several courts continue to place more weight on 
whether the evidence involved the same decisionmaker.59 Indeed, 
employers can sometimes use this factor to their advantage by 
proving that it was the “same decisionmaker” who made the decision 
to hire and fire the alleged victim.60 
Fourth, when the “me too” witness and the plaintiff are otherwise 
similarly situated, courts are more likely to allow the “me too” 
	  
56 See Hayes, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
57 See, e.g., Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the court should have determined if the “me too” evidence was a “relevant component 
of the ‘mosaic’ of evidence”); see also Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 598–99 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
58 See, e.g., Griffin, 689 F.3d at 598–99. 
59 See, e.g., Hayes, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 144 (following other courts that found “me too” 
admissible when there was a “common decisionmaker”); see also Day v. Sears Holdings 
Corp., No. CV 11-09068 MMM(PJWx), 2013 WL 1010547, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 
2013); Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2012); Zelaya 
v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2010); Mugavero v. Arms Acres, 
Inc., No. 03 Civ. 05724(PGG), 2009 WL 1904548, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2009). 
60 Compare Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting the notion that whenever the claimant has been hired and fired by the same 
decisionmaker a strong inference of discrimination exists), with Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 
796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that where the same individual was the hirer and 
firer, and the termination occurred shortly after the hiring, discrimination was most likely 
not a determining factor). 
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evidence.61 The weight of this factor can vary, however, because 
courts do not uniformly define “similarly situated.”62 Nonetheless, 
recent case law has provided guidance. For example, when the “me 
too” witness has a different title, different job responsibilities, and 
reports to different supervisors, courts are unlikely to find the 
individual similarly situated to the plaintiff.63 Moreover, when the 
“me too” witness is not employed by the employer, but instead works 
at the parent corporation or for a different company altogether, courts 
will exclude the “me too” evidence based on this factor alone.64 
Beyond these factors, recent case law indicates that courts are 
equally strict, if not more strict, about admitting “me too” evidence 
than they were prior to Sprint.65 Further, “me too” evidence is 
routinely excluded based on the same reasons as pre-Sprint decisions. 
For instance, courts regularly exclude “me too” evidence where the 
probative value of such evidence is outweighed by unfair prejudice.66 
Specifically, courts reason that this form of evidence amounts to 
subjective personal beliefs and opinions that are highly prejudicial.67 
Other courts exclude “me too” evidence because of the danger of a 
“trial within a trial.”68 Lastly, courts have continued to exclude “me 
too” evidence that is irrelevant. For example, when a plaintiff 
attempts to offer testimony of discrimination experienced by others 
while working for different companies, courts will find the testimony 	  
61 See, e.g., Hardy v. Shell Chem. Co., 693 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622-23 (E.D. La. 2010); 
McCoy v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n., 216 Cal. App. 4th 283, 297–98 (2013). 
62 Tricia M. Beckles, Class of One: Are Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an 
Insurmountable Disadvantage if They Have no “Similarly Situated” Comparators?, 10 U. 
PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 459, 469 (2008) (discussing how “similarly situated” is not 
uniformly defined across the circuits). 
63 See, e.g., Nuskey v. Hochberg, 723 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.D.C. 2010). 
64 See, e.g., Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 168 (3d. Cir. 2013); 
L’Etoile v. New England Finish Sys., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 331, 336 (D.N.H. 2008). 
65 See, e.g., Mandel, 706 F.3d at 168; Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc. 616 F.3d 134, 134 
(2d Cir. 2010); Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734 (S.D. Ohio 
2011); Lawson-Brewster v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 617 F. Supp. 2d 589, 589 (W.D. 
Mich. 2008); Murphy v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 4:07-CV-605-A, 2008 WL 4966659, 
at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2008); Hatai v. Dep’t of Transp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1298 
(2013). 
66 See, e.g., Johnson v. Interstate Brands Corp., 351 F. App’x, 36, 41 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Jones, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 734–35; Lewis v. City of Chi., 563 F. Supp. 2d 905, 922 (N.D. 
Ill. 2008). 
67 See, e.g., Jones, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 734–35. 
68 See, e.g., Lawson-Brewster, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 595; Hall v. Mid-State Mach. Prods., 
895 F. Supp. 2d 243, 272 (D. Me. 2012); McClendon v. Dougherty, No. 2:10-CV-1339, 
2011 WL 4345901, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011). 
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irrelevant.69 In addition, even though a “me too” witness might have 
worked at the same company as the plaintiff, certain courts have held 
that their experience is not necessarily relevant or automatically 
admissible.70 
In short, post-Sprint cases demonstrate that plaintiffs attempting to 
offer “me too” evidence have many hurdles to overcome at the lower 
court level. Plaintiffs will not be able to rely on some tangential 
connection between the “me too” witness and her own 
circumstances.71 Indeed, whether “me too” evidence is admitted may 
depend entirely on how the original complaint is pled.72 
Unfortunately, it is less clear what factors courts are likely to give the 
most emphasis, particularly when one factor is isolated at the expense 
of other potentially relevant factors. 
B. “Not Me Too” Evidence 
“Me too” evidence has traditionally been offered exclusively by 
plaintiffs. However, one concept that has received limited attention 
among most courts and scholars is the admissibility of the converse 
form of “me too” evidence. This Comment will refer to it as “not me 
too” evidence. Like its counterpart, “not me too” evidence allows an 
employer to rebut a plaintiff’s discrimination claim by introducing 
testimony of other employees to show that they did not suffer 
discrimination. Even though “not me too” evidence has often been 
overlooked, the concept is actually not new at all. 
Prior to Sprint, employers were already relying on “not me too” 
evidence. One of the first cases to demonstrate the use of such 
evidence was Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co.73 In that case, 
the plaintiff, age forty-five, was discharged by his supervisor and filed 	  
69 L’Etoile, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (holding that such evidence was irrelevant when it 
did not “appear to have ever infected [the plaintiff’s] working environment”); see also 
Davis v. Dunn Constr. Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1318 (N.D. Ala. 2012). 
70 L’Etoile, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 337. 
71 See, e.g., Davis, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (describing the other employees’ evidence 
as a “watered-down version of ‘me too’ evidence”); Kakkanathu v. Rohn Indus., Inc., No. 
05-1337, 2008 WL 4330144, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008) (requiring a causal nexus). 
72 See, e.g., Hatai v. Dep’t of Transp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1298 (2013) (holding 
that the “me too” evidence was properly excluded because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged 
discrimination based on his race and national origin as Japanese and Asian, but did not 
allege pro-Arab favoritism). 
73 Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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an age discrimination suit under the ADEA.74 The district court 
allowed the plaintiff to offer evidence that the defendant hired 
numerous individuals under the age of forty.75 The employer rebutted 
this argument by offering testimony of another employee who was the 
same age as the plaintiff and was hired several seasons later.76 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision and held that subsequent good acts by an 
employer constitute an exception to Rule 404’s general exclusion of 
character evidence because it is relevant to the employer’s 
discriminatory intent.77 The court reasoned that subsequent acts by an 
employer against employees could be less probative of an employer’s 
intent than prior acts.78 However, the court added that subsequent acts 
still have probative value and are therefore relevant to intent.79 In 
addition, the court noted that the relevance of a prior or subsequent 
act could be affected if it is too remote in time or there were changed 
circumstances.80 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that no bright line 
rule exists for when evidence is too remote to be relevant.81 Thus, the 
court concluded that the employer’s hiring and treatment of the 
subsequent employee made it less likely that he acted with 
discriminatory intent when he fired the plaintiff.82 
As one of the first decisions to apply “not me too” evidence, Ansell 
can help clarify how this form of evidence is applied in practice. To 
begin with, “not me too” evidence may be admissible under FRE 
404(b). Although it is unlike typical FRE 404(b) evidence, which is 
offered to show prior bad acts in criminal cases, this is irrelevant. 
Beyond prior bad acts, FRE 404(b) also addresses “other acts,” and 
may be applied equally in criminal and civil cases. Consequently, like 
in Ansell, an employer may argue “not me too” by offering other acts 	  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 519. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 523. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, 
wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 
404(b)(1). “This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
78 Ansell, 347 F.3d at 524. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 525. 
82 Id. 
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as evidence to show a subsequent good act. Of course, such evidence 
is only admissible in the employment context if offered for the proper 
purpose.83 For instance, in Ansell, the employer’s purpose in offering 
testimony of another employee was proper because it was used to 
prove that the employer did not have discriminatory intent against the 
plaintiff.84 Thus, the employer’s “not me too” evidence proved to be 
an effective tool because it allowed the employer to both rebut a claim 
of an overarching plan of discrimination and further support the 
legitimacy of its reason for terminating the plaintiff. 
In post-Sprint cases, employers continue to rely on “not me too” 
evidence and, unlike “me too” evidence, courts consistently hold that 
“not me too” evidence is admissible.85 Ironically, the inquiry involves 
the same factors used to determine the admissibility of “me too” 
evidence, including temporal proximity, whether the “me too” witness 
and plaintiff were otherwise similarly situated, and whether the 
situation involved the same decisionmakers.86 Nevertheless, courts 
apply the standard much more leniently in the context of “not me too” 
evidence. For example, in Elion v. Jackson, the court reasoned that, 
because the other employees were similarly situated, promoted within 
the same time period, and promoted by the same two officials accused 
of discriminating and retaliating against the plaintiff, the “not me too” 
testimony was relevant and admissible to negate the inference that the 
defendant harbored discriminatory or retaliatory intent.87 
In practice, employers rely on “not me too” evidence to rebut 
plaintiffs’ “me too” evidence and therefore negate discriminatory 
intent. For example, in the racial discrimination case Howard v. 	  
83 See, e.g., Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1995). 
84 Ansell, 347 F.3d at 525. 
85 See, e.g., Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008); Howard v. D.C. Pub. 
Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 53 (D.D.C. 2008); Rodriguez v. Chertoff, No. CIV 05-546-
TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 5087209, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2008); Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal. 
App. 4th 87, 87 (2011); Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 173 
Cal. App. 4th 740, 759 (2009); see also Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 381, 
381–82 (E.D. La. 2008) (admitting “not me too” evidence in a collective action to 
demonstrate the employer’s proper employment policies and procedures). 
86 See, e.g., Elion, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
87 Id. at 9 (noting that the first employee was also a woman, promoted within the same 
time period, and given additional oversight responsibility all around the same time the 
plaintiff alleged various discriminatory and retaliatory acts against her. Moreover, the 
second employee was also an African American woman, promoted to a director’s position 
within four months of Ms. Elion’s reassignment, and promoted by the same officials 
accused of discriminating and retaliating against Ms. Elion.). 
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District of Columbia Public Schools, a plaintiff alleged that the 
District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) acted with 
discriminatory motive in not selecting her for a dental hygienist 
position.88 To rebut that claim, the defendant employer sought to 
elicit testimony from a DCPS employee who participated in the 
interviewing process that led to the plaintiff not being selected.89 The 
purpose was to show that another African American woman was 
selected for the same position in an earlier round of interviews.90 The 
court reasoned that the evidence was relevant under FRE 401 because 
evidence that the DCPS employee did not act discriminatorily in the 
earlier interviewing process was strong evidence from which a jury 
could infer that he did not act discriminatorily in the second 
interview.91 In addition, the court reasoned that based on the facts and 
circumstances of the case, the testimony would not be unduly 
prejudicial or confusing under FRE 403.92 
Similarly, in Watson v. Pennsylvania, Department of Public 
Welfare, after a plaintiff lost her job and did not receive a promotion 
to a supervisory position for which she was qualified, she filed suit 
alleging that the Department of Public Welfare discriminated against 
her based on gender.93 In response, the defendant employer sought to 
offer testimony from other female employees that the plaintiff had not 
suffered discrimination.94 The court allowed the defendant employer 
to offer “not me too” evidence to negate discriminatory intent because 
the plaintiff’s case relied on whether management advanced a general 
discriminatory agenda.95 In addition, the court concluded that, 
although other employees may not have held the same position as the 
plaintiff, their perspectives were “similar enough” to allow the court 
to admit the evidence.96 
While courts might not be aware of how they treat both forms of 
evidence, these cases seem to indicate that courts apply a more lenient 
standard to “not me too” evidence. That is, rather than conduct a 
detailed analysis based on several objective factors, courts routinely 	  
88 Howard, 561 F. Supp. 2d. at 54. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 55. 
92 Id. 
93 Watson v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 4:07-CV-2048, 2009 WL 1324112, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. May 12, 2009). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at *2. 
96 Id. 
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admit “not me too” evidence.97 It appears that this could be a bit of 
judicial oversight. In other words, courts might not realize they are 
applying the standard in a disparate manner.98 
C. “Me Too” vs. “Not Me Too” Evidence 
The disparate treatment of “me too” and “not me too” evidence is 
most evident when both types of evidence are present in the same 
case. Although courts tend to liberally admit “not me too” evidence, 
does this happen when “me too” evidence is also offered? The 
following cases illustrate this parody.99 Interestingly, these cases 
suggest that trial courts are applying the standard in a disparate 
manner, but appellate courts appear to have identified the problem 
and try to correct it on appeal. 
The first case to demonstrate this disparate treatment is Johnson v. 
United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation.100 There, a 
plaintiff sought to introduce “me too” evidence from five former 
employees that alleged they too were terminated because of their 
pregnancy.101 Although the trial court held that such evidence was 
inadmissible, the defendant employer was able to offer “not me too” 
evidence to demonstrate its past conduct concerning pregnancy and 
pregnancy leaves.102  The defendant employer’s evidence included a 
declaration by an employee that stated she worked for the defendant 
during her pregnancy, took a pregnancy leave of absence, and 
returned to work shortly thereafter.103 In addition, the director of 
human resources noted that while the defendant employer had over 
500 employees, the majority of whom were women, the employer 
frequently received requests for pregnancy leaves and routinely 
	  
97 See, e.g., McKinnie v. Conley, No. 04-932, 2006 WL 3702647, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
8, 2006). 
98 See, e.g., Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
courts defer to employers’ judgment). 
99 Although these cases were filed under California’s Fair Employment Housing Act, 
that statute provides protections similar to Title VII, and generally follows the same 
federal provisions. 
100 Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 173 Cal. App. 4th 740, 
759 (2009). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 762. 
103 Id. 
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granted them.104 Nevertheless, the defendant employer’s “not me too” 
evidence was not enough to support a finding for summary 
judgment.105 
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed and held that the plaintiff’s 
“me too” evidence was per se admissible.106 The court reasoned that 
the plaintiff’s declarations from the former employees set out factual 
scenarios sufficiently similar to her because they too were: (1) fired 
by the defendant after they became pregnant, (2) knew of someone 
fired by the defendant because of being pregnant, (3) resigned 
because the supervisor made their work stressful after noticing they 
were trying to become pregnant, and (4) knew of occasions when 
employees that were dishonest or cited for dishonesty were not fired 
by the defendant.107 The court also found that the former employees 
were similarly situated to the plaintiff because they worked at the 
same facility and were supervised by the same people.108 Therefore, 
based on all of these similarities, the court held that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to the employer.109 
Understanding why the “me too” evidence was more effective in 
Johnson requires a closer look at what was said and by whom. One of 
the most distinguishing differences is that the “me too” evidence was 
significantly more compelling than the “not me too” evidence. 
Indeed, one declaration came from an employee who attended a 
meeting in which the managers discussed the desire to fire a pregnant 
employee because she was a potential liability.110 Recognizing that it 
would be illegal, the managers instead discussed excuses they could 
use to fire the employee.111 Another employee noted that one of these 
managers fired her and admitted that it was because she was 
pregnant.112 A third employee told a client that she was pregnant and 
two days later, the same managers fired her without providing a 
reason for it.113 Finally, another employee told these managers that 
she was trying to become pregnant and, in turn, they accused her of 	  
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 740. 
106 Id. at 767. 
107 Id. at 759. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 767. 
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falsifying her timecards.114 Ironically, these same managers tolerated 
several other similar incidents of timecard discrepancies from 
employees who were not pregnant.115 In sum, the plaintiff’s “me too” 
evidence was unlike typical “me too” evidence; rather, it was more 
like the rare smoking gun evidence because it essentially amounted to 
admissions of discrimination. 
Although the “me too” evidence in Johnson was extreme, this 
decision still has significant implications for “me too” evidence 
generally. Most notably, Johnson expanded the scope of “me too” 
evidence by holding that it is per se admissible if offered by other 
employees who worked under the same supervisor.116 In addition, 
Johnson expanded the scope even further by holding that “me too” 
evidence from other workplaces and by different supervisors may be 
admissible.117 
“Me too” and “not me too” evidence also received different 
treatment in Pantoja v. Anton.118 In that case, the plaintiff filed suit 
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for racial discrimination 
and sexual harassment and discrimination.119 The plaintiff sought to 
introduce “me too” evidence that her employer engaged in a pattern 
of harassment and discrimination against his female employees.120 
The trial court concluded that the other witnesses could not testify 
about discriminatory or harassing events unless the plaintiff had 
personally witnessed the acts, and the acts adversely affected her 
working environment.121 Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the 
defendant employer to admit “not me too” evidence of four witnesses 
without limiting the time period to when the plaintiff was 
employed.122 
On appeal, the court of appeal reasoned that the trial court created a 
double standard by allowing the employer to admit evidence 
supporting his general course of conduct.123 The court held that “me 	  
114 Id. at 762. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 767 (citing Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008)). 
118 Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal. App. 4th 87, 87 (2011). 
119 Id. at 102. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 94. 
122 Id. at 105–06. 
123 Id. 
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too” evidence that the employer harassed other women outside the 
presence of the plaintiff and when she was not an employee should 
have been admissible to prove discriminatory intent or motive.124 
Pantoja has several implications for “me too” evidence. Most 
notably, after Pantoja, “me too” evidence is admissible, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff employee worked with the “me too” witness. As 
such, a plaintiff need not have any firsthand knowledge of the “me 
too” evidence. While an employer in the past might have claimed that 
the alleged harasser did not engage in the conduct in front of the 
plaintiff, after Pantoja, this is no longer a good defense. In addition, 
this decision shows that “me too” evidence may also be used to 
impeach the alleged harasser’s credibility. For example, in Pantoja, 
such evidence was used to show that the employer had discriminatory 
intent or bias based on gender to rebut his claim of a zero tolerance 
policy for sexual harassment.125 Finally, after this decision, “me too” 
evidence may be used to prove different forms of discriminatory 
conduct. In dicta, the court stated that “evidence of one type of 
discriminatory conduct can even be probative of a defendant’s mental 
state in engaging in another type of conduct.”126 Thus, this implies 
that “me too” evidence is admissible regardless of whether the other 
witness suffered the same type of discrimination as the plaintiff. 
On the other hand, because Pantoja is such a significant departure 
from precedent, critics have argued that the “me too” evidence 
offered in that case was inadmissible character evidence. This 
argument finds support in the previous decision, Beyda v. City of Los 
Angeles, in which the court held that “me too” evidence of other 
employees is barred to establish the defendant’s propensity to 
harass.127 Nonetheless, the court of appeal in Pantoja distinguished 
Beyda by reasoning that the evidence was relevant to show 
discriminatory intent or bias.128 Although “me too” evidence may be 
used for this purpose, it is questionable whether this happened in 
Pantoja. Rather, the evidence appears to have been used for the 
purpose to show that the harasser was a bad person because he 
mistreated others in a similar way. Thus, the lower court may have 
been correct in excluding the evidence. 
	  
124 Id. at 110. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 115. 
127 Beyda v. City of L.A., 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 518 (1998). 
128 See Pantoja, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 114. 
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As a final note, even though the evidentiary issue in Pantoja 
related to a harassment claim, it can be generalized to discrimination-
based claims, because the court used “me too” evidence to prove the 
intent of the harasser. The court found intent relevant in order for the 
plaintiff to show that the harasser engaged in conduct because of her 
sex, as opposed to generalized harassment of both genders, which 
would be lawful. However, intent is generally not required to proving 
a harassment claim; rather, there is a different standard of proof. The 
plaintiff must be able to prove that the harassment was so severe and 
pervasive that the conditions of the individual’s employment were 
altered.129 In other words, while proving discrimination can be 
challenging, proving harassment is an even higher threshold to 
overcome.130 In Pantoja, the court of appeal ignored the fact that 
intent is generally not relevant to proving harassment. While this 
decision also involved a discrimination claim based on gender, where 
intent is relevant, the court should not have been able to treat the two 
claims as one in determining the admissibility of “me too” evidence. 
Because allowing “me too” evidence in this context is a rarity, this 
raises the issue of whether state courts such as those in California—a 
leader in employment law—are subtly making a statement to courts at 
the federal level. Does Pantoja serve as a reminder of what can 
happen when lower courts fail to conduct a case-by-case analysis in 
determining the admissibility of “me too” evidence? 
V 
WHY ARE COURTS TREATING “ME TOO” EVIDENCE DIFFERENTLY? 
Although the aforementioned cases in Part IV are distinct, they 
share one common trait: “not me too” evidence was held admissible. 
This leads to the question of why do courts treat “not me too” 
evidence differently, when in theory it seems the same as “me too” 
evidence? Is the discrepancy a result of courts simply not thinking 
about it? Or, is there a more compelling reason for courts’ disparate 
treatment? 
	  
129 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
130 Evan D.H. White, A Hostile Environment: How the “Severe or Pervasive” 
Requirement and the Employer’s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs 
in a Catch-22, 47 B.C. L. REV. 853, 853 (2006) (discussing the strict “severe or pervasive” 
standard applied in sexual harassment cases). 
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Courts are well aware of the controversial nature of “me too” 
evidence. Indeed, several courts explicitly caution against this 
evidence and only let it in sparingly.131 On the other hand, the 
disparate treatment of “me too” evidence does not appear to rise to the 
level of judicial hostility.132 In fact, “not me too” evidence has rarely 
been labeled as such, and therefore, courts might be oblivious to the 
differential treatment given to both forms of evidence. Moreover, 
because “not me too” evidence is used by employers less often than 
“me too” evidence, courts could be unaware of the disparity between 
the two forms of evidence. Nonetheless, more compelling reasons 
suggest otherwise. 
First, there is reason to believe that lower courts are not 
consistently conducting a fact-based inquiry when confronted with 
“me too” and “not me too” evidence. Most notably, some of these 
cases have similar facts, yet lead to different results depending on 
whether “me too” or “not me too” evidence is present.133 In addition, 
the mere length dedicated to the analysis in court opinions is 
indicative of this disparate treatment. Some courts, for example, will 
dedicate several paragraphs to assessing whether the “me too” 
evidence is admissible, while other courts will devote a single 
paragraph to “not me too” evidence.134 In short, this suggests that 
courts are deciding each case based on the result that they want to 
reach, as opposed to conducting a case-by-case analysis. This type of 
approach does not work well, particularly in the context of 
employment discrimination claims, which are highly unique, fact 
based, and context specific. 	  
131 See, e.g., Hall v. Mid-State Mach. Prods., 895 F. Supp. 2d 243, 271 (D. Me. 2012) 
(noting that courts caution against admitting “me too” evidence because it is “‘too 
attenuated’ to justify admission”); Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 
1236 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (finding “me too” evidence suspect even when offered to show 
pretext rather than a prima facie case); Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 
734 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (discussing how “me too” evidence is “unwelcome because it is at 
best only slightly relevant and is always highly prejudicial”); Johnson v. United Cerebral 
Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 173 Cal. App. 4th 740, 760 (2009) (discussing how 
courts routinely sanction “me too” evidence). 
132 See Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial 
Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 563 (2009). 
133 Compare Jones, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (holding that “me too” evidence was not 
relevant because the other employee’s discrimination occurred before the plaintiff’s 
alleged racial discrimination), with Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(holding that “not me too” evidence was relevant even though it involved the employer’s 
past nondiscriminatory behavior toward other employees). 
134 Compare Nuskey v. Hochberg, 723 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.D.C. 2010), with 
Howard v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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Another reason for the disparate treatment of “me too” and “not me 
too” evidence is reflected in the adoption of rigid rules that function 
to undermine plaintiffs’ proof.135 These judicially created rule-like 
tests provide courts with an efficient method to deal with employment 
discrimination cases, which are often complex and time consuming. 
However, the problem with these rules is that judges rely on them to 
“bypass a reasoned analysis of the totality of the circumstances of a 
case, in favor of a rotely applied label.”136 Professor Gertner, a 
scholar and former federal district judge, has referred to this 
phenomenon as “Losers’ Rules.”137 Essentially, judges use these rules 
as a blueprint that serves to “justify prodefendant outcomes,”138 and 
in turn, “substantially lighten the employer’s burden of proof and 
make summary judgment in his or her favor increasingly likely.”139  In 
the employment context, examples of these rules include the “stray 
remark doctrine,”140 “honest belief” rule,141 and “same-actor 
inference.”142 The evidentiary doctrine of “me too” evidence is no 
exception.143 Over time, these rules have not only functioned to 
systematically foreclose plaintiffs’ claims, but have also provided 	  
135 See Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A 
Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of 
Employment Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 757–60 
(2013) (discussing how courts use defendant friendly “shortcuts” like the same-actor 
inference and stray remark doctrines to dispose of employment discrimination cases); see 
also Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 906 (2002) 
(explaining and analyzing the implications of shortcuts or heuristics used by courts). 
136 Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 111, 133 (2011). 
137 Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110 (2012). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 121. 
140 The “stray remark doctrine” allows courts to disregard a discriminatory comment or 
remark as “stray” when it is isolated or unrelated to the adverse employment action. See 
Stone, supra note 30, at 180–81 (discussing how courts use the stray remark doctrine to 
isolate one factor at the expense of a holistic assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances, and thus, bypass the proper summary judgment standard). 
141 The “honest belief” rule relieves employers for any actions they take based on a 
mistake, good faith belief, or poor business judgment. See Martin, supra note 10, at 313. 
142 Under the “same-actor inference,” when the same person hires an employee and 
later fires that employee, a discriminatory motive to fire is irrational and illogical. See 
Ross B. Goldman, Putting Pretext in Context: Employment Discrimination, the Same-
Actor Inference, and the Proper Role of Judges and Juries, 93 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1535 
(2007). 
143 See, e.g., Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2012) 
(noting that “me too” evidence is highly suspect). 
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employers with more defensive strategies.144 Judicial economy and 
efficiency are legitimate concerns of the court. However, when courts 
apply a more rigorous standard to “me too” evidence, they create a 
double standard that prevents both parties from having an equal 
opportunity to present their case. 
Finally, the disparate treatment of “me too” evidence encompasses 
a larger issue, specifically that courts are misapplying the McDonnell 
Douglas framework during the critical pretext stage. For years, courts 
and scholars have recognized the pretext stage as a stumbling block 
for plaintiffs.145 The Supreme Court attempted to remedy this by 
establishing the McDonnell Douglas framework to provide plaintiffs 
an opportunity to prove discrimination indirectly.146 However, 
because of courts’ convoluted views on the issue of pretext, the 
framework has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.147 
According to Professor Natasha Martin, “pretext is in peril.”148 
Plaintiffs may have various methods to prove pretext, yet they have 
limited guidance on the amount or type of evidence that is required to 
successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment or motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.149 As courts engage in judicial 
rulemaking, the direct result has been to “chip away” at plaintiffs’ 
evidence of discrimination.150 
Beyond the reasons why courts are treating “me too” and “not me 
too” evidence differently is the discrete issue of how this disparity can 
be resolved. Resolving exactly how courts can provide similar 
scrutiny to these two forms of evidence is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. Nonetheless, Professor Gertner provides a suitable 
framework that is worth noting. First, acknowledge the problem.151 	  
144 Martin, supra note 10, at 345 (explaining how these judicially created rules have 
equipped employers with a “playbook” full of defenses and loopholes). 
145 See, e.g., Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 
1998) (comparing the prima facie stage “where the inquiry is based on a few generalized 
factors” with the pretext stage where “the factual inquiry into the alleged discriminatory 
motives of the employer has risen to a new level of specificity”); see also Martin, supra 
note 10, at 344. 
146 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). 
147 See Donald & Pardue, supra note 135, at 754–55 (noting how the Supreme Court 
has left open avenues for the pretext-plus rule’s continued application); Trina Jones, Anti-
Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 424 (2010) (discussing how courts 
began to require plaintiffs to produce additional evidence, or pretext-plus, to prevail). 
148 Martin, supra note 10, at 317. 
149 Id. at 344. 
150 Id. at 391, 401. 
151 Gertner, supra note 137, at 123. 
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This Comment has focused on this step by analyzing how and why 
courts are responding to these two forms of evidence in a disparate 
manner. By exposing this issue, hopefully this Comment will promote 
greater awareness and lead to further discussion among judges, 
scholars, and practitioners. Second, address the problem directly.152 
Regardless of whether “me too” or “not me too” evidence is offered, 
courts must engage in a case-by-case, comprehensive, and reasoned 
analysis.153 Instead of isolating one factor at the expense of other 
factors, courts need to holistically assess the totality of the 
circumstances when evaluating either form of evidence.154 Lastly, 
courts should make an effort to write opinions explaining what 
qualifies as “me too” or “not me too” evidence, and what does not.155 
By clarifying what facts comprise discrimination, the judiciary can 
provide guidance to plaintiffs during the pretext stage. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that plaintiffs have less information to begin with, courts’ 
leniency towards employers is ironic. In the employment context, 
plaintiffs are at a substantial disadvantage in comparison to employers 
because they usually have no direct evidence. Instead, plaintiffs must 
rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence to establish an employer’s 
discriminatory intent. Nonetheless, when courts apply stricter scrutiny 
to plaintiffs, this goes against the very purpose of Title VII.156  The 
direct result is that Title VII often fails to combat the prejudicial 
disparate treatment it was designed to eradicate.157 As some scholars 
have recognized, it is precisely “the unfettered discretion of courts 
that ‘can be the locus of hidden discrimination,’ particularly in light 
of the abbreviated record at the heart of a court’s pre-trial 
	  
152 Id. 
153 See generally Moss, supra note 132, at 551 (arguing that courts are guilty of 
“judicial modesty” in which they are reluctant to engage in close scrutiny of critically 
important facts). 
154 Stone, supra note 30, at 181–82 (proposing that courts holistically assess the totality 
of the circumstances when evaluating the probative value of a comment under the stray 
remark doctrine). 
155 Gertner, supra note 137, at 123. 
156 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is intended to irradiate discrimination and 
make the victim whole again. 
157 Martin, supra note 10, at 313. 
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evaluation.”158 By applying a restrictive methodology to plaintiffs, 
courts undermine the protection that antidiscrimination laws were 
designed to offer. 
Recent case law demonstrates that courts have been more liberal 
about admitting the converse form of “me too” evidence—so-called 
“not me too” evidence. This Comment has attempted to illustrate this 
discrepancy and the reasons for it. While there is no one solution to 
remedy this disparity, courts should be sensitive to the disparate 
manner in how they respond to “me too” evidence as opposed to “not 
me too” evidence. Perhaps, with this new perspective, courts will be 
more thoughtful and apply similar scrutiny to both forms of evidence. 
 
	  
158 Martin, supra note 10, at 384 (quoting Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709 
(2007)). 
